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how quickly a conflict-avoidance take turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that 
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Second, many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the 
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Abstract: We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination 
game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-
to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether 
and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show 
that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. 
Second, many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the 
inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the 
likelihood of conflict resolution regardless of whether communication is unilateral or bilateral.  
 
Keywords: Coordination, communication, one-way communication, two-way 
communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment. 
JEL-code: C91, D74, L15, H71 
 
a Distance Learning University of Switzerland, Ueberlandstrasse 12 CH-3900 Brig, Switzerland; tjasa.maillard-
bjedov@unidistance.ch. 
b University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland; thierry.madies@unifr.ch. 
c Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, 
Ecully, France; villeval@gate.cnrs.fr. 
d IZA, Bonn, Germany. 
e Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck. 
 
Acknowledgments:  We are grateful to Q. Thévenet who programmed this experiment, Z. Dai for research 
assistance, N. Houy, S. Lapointe and P Solal for useful discussions. This research has been supported by a 
grant from the University of Fribourg and was performed within the framework of the LABEX CORTEX 
(ANR-11-LABX-0042) of Université de Lyon, within the program “Investissements d'Avenir” (ANR-11-
IDEX-007) operated by the French National Research Agency (ANR).  
  2 
1. Introduction 
Coordination failures are frequent in organizations and lead to huge losses of efficiency. 
Several studies have shown that communication can alleviate coordination failures, both when 
the players’ interests are aligned (Cooper et al., 1992; Crawford, 1998; Charness, 2000; Duffy 
and Feltovich, 2002; Blume and Ortmann, 2007) and when they are not (Cooper et al., 1989; 
Dickhaut et al., 1995; Cason and Mui, 2014). In particular, the asymmetry of payoffs between 
two players usually generates a conflict because both have an incentive to select the option 
that maximizes their own earnings. To solve the conflict, one player has to be accommodating 
and accept to play the option that earns him a lower payoff. Turn taking is a coordination 
strategy that is used to solve the coordination problem in repeated games (Bornstein et al., 
1997; Bashkar, 2000; Helbing et al., 2005; Lau and Mui, 2008, 2012; Kaplan and Ruffle, 
2012; Bruttel and Güth, 2013; Cason et al., 2013). Turn taking, where each player alternates 
the good and the bad turns, can maximize efficiency while minimizing inequality in the long 
run.1 Communication may also help people to overcome these conflicts. Only a few papers 
have, however, considered turn taking and communication simultaneously (Zillante, 2011; 
Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori, 2012; Evans et al., 2013). Yet, communication might help players 
to learn the strategy more quickly and to decide who should take the first advantage. 
Moreover, the literature on coordination failures has mainly considered one-stage games. Are 
communication and turn taking as effective when a game is two-staged?  
The major novelty of our paper is to study by means of a laboratory experiment the impact 
of cheap talk communication and the emergence of turn taking in a symmetric two-player two-
                                                          
1 One can find several examples of turn taking strategies in real settings. Turn taking is indeed a frequent pattern 
in conversation, driving, product release, dividing household chores, etc. Lau and Mui (2012) give examples of 
common pool resources dilemmas and recall that Berkes (1992) reports examples from fishermen in Turkey 
using turn taking strategies to allocate fishing spots and that Ostrom (1990) evokes rotation schemes in Spain 
and the Philippines for the use of irrigation systems. 
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stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. A typical illustration of this type of games 
is the vertical differentiation model formalized by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked 
and Sutton (1982) where firms can avoid price wars in the second stage of their interactions 
by offering goods of different quality levels in the first stage. Another example is the regional 
fiscal competition model (Justman et al., 2005) where regions have to decide first on how 
much to invest in infrastructures to attract firms and next, they have to design their tax policy. 
In this situation, if both regions are unable to diffentiate in terms of quality of infrastructures 
in the first stage, they will start a tax war in the second stage to attact firms, with deleterious 
effects on profits.  
The question of whether communication is able to solve this type of two-stage 
coordination problem is not trivial. Indeed, several examples show that in spite of obvious 
(and often repeated) communication opportunities agents often fail to cooperate by taking 
turns. The aforementioned example of inter-jurisdictional competition provides evidence, 
based on estimation of fiscal reaction functions, that local jurisdictions mimic each other 
instead of differentiating from one another (see Revelli, 2006, for a survey). This mimicking 
happens even when public officials belong to the same political party, i.e. even when 
communication opportunities are frequent. This “copy cat” behavior is observed notably in 
neighboring jurisdictions when public officials decide to develop industrial parks offering the 
same type of services to businesses without trying to target different kinds of companies 
although local officials meet frequently in regional jurisdictions.2,3 
                                                          
2 In particular, the French Auditing Court (“Cour des Comptes”) has released two reports (1996; 2004) that 
repeatedly denounced the wasteful investments made by neighboring municipalities in industrial parks that end 
up empty by lack of a good specialization and lead to a face-to-face tax competition. 
3 Other examples in which communication opportunities are not able to solve two-stage coordination problems 
are provided by local political elections when two close parties decide each to maintain their candidate despite 
long negotiations, with the risk of having no candidate elected for the leading position and with the consequence 
of not being able to form a coalition to implement their preferred policy after the elections. Allocation of new 
available land may also lead to a conflict between farmers who bid for the same spots even after having 
communicated. The conflict in the second stage is all the more likely that neighboring farmers may be willing to 
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To reproduce this type of strategic situations, in the first stage of our finitely repeated 
two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs, two players have to choose 
independently and simultaneously between two options, knowing that their decisions will 
determine the options that will be available in the second stage and thereby the attainable 
payoffs. In the second stage, after being informed of the other player’s choice in the first stage 
players have to choose independently and simultaneously between two new options. Payoffs 
are determined and distributed to players only at the end of the second stage. The game has 
two subgame perfect Nash equilibria. If both players opt in the first stage for the option that 
maximizes their own payoff and disregard the payoff of their partner, they will have to choose 
in the second stage between two options with conflicting payoffs but which, in any case, will 
earn them less than if they were able to differentiate their choices in the first stage. On the 
opposite, coordination –corresponding to the social optimum– is achieved when the two 
players select opposite options in each stage. In our setting this leads one player to earn more 
than the other from both stages.  
Our experimental design, involving repeated interactions in fixed pairs during 20 periods 
aims at testing whether players learn using strategies that avoid a head-to-head confrontation 
and allow them to coordinate on opposite choices in both stages. In particular, we examine 
how frequently partners adopt a turn taking strategy –meaning that each player takes their turn 
over alternating periods as the high earnings player– in order to maximize efficiency and 
reduce payoffs inequality in the long run.  
In testing the relationship between turn taking and communication, we hypothesize that 
pre-play communication may facilitate the use of a turn taking strategy in our two-stage game 
                                                          
grow the same kind of crops on the new spots. Finally, day-to-day life also illustrates that frequent 
communication may not be sufficient to avoid coordination failures. For example, within the household the 
unability to share chores by turn taking in stage 1 may have negative consequences on the quality of coordination 
about leisure in stage 2.    
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with asymmetric payoffs. To test this hypothesis, we introduced cheap talk communication 
(Farrel and Rabin, 1996) in two treatments. Because the previous literature on coordination 
games has shown that depending on the game, either unilateral communication or bilateral 
communication is more efficient (Cooper et al., 1989, 1992; Brandts and Cooper, 2007; 
Ellingsen and Östling, 2010), we implemented both a two-way communication treatment 
(Two-Way, hereafter) and a one-way communication treatment (One-Way, hereafter). In the 
Two-Way treatment, subjects are allowed to exchange messages via a chat box for a minute 
at the beginning of each period. In the One-Way treatment only one of the two players –always 
the same- is allowed to send messages. The ability to send messages is determined by the 
relative performance of each player in a preliminary task. Endowing only one player with the 
right to communicate aims at testing whether this characteristic is used as an instrument for 
leadership –which should facilitate coordination- but also whether this player takes advantage 
of his higher status to increase his claims, possibly changing the frequency of alternation 
between periods –which may intensify the conflict. In our game with conflicting interests 
between the two players, we expect that unilateral communication may reduce the risk of 
miscoordination compared to the bilateral communication because it serves as a conflict 
resolution mode, as shown by Cooper et al. (1989) in the battle-of-the-sexes game, except if 
the player who gets the right to communicate uses it to increase his bargaining power at his 
sole advantage. Considering the results of the literature on communication in one-stage games, 
we naturally expect that communication will improve the ability of players to coordinate in 
our repeated two-stage games; but the extent to which communication is able to overcome 
coordination failures in this environment that requires a deeper reasoning remains unknown.  
Our main results are threefold. First, in the absence of communication almost half of the 
groups selected simultaneously identical options at both stages of the game and consequently 
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failed to solve the conflict. Our second finding is that some groups learned turn taking over 
time, which permitted a durable resolution of the conflict. The third result is that introducing 
two-way communication increased to 91% the proportion of the groups managing to resolve 
the conflict by allowing players to implement immediately a systematic and durable turn 
taking strategy. 85.86% of the groups played the social optimum. Finally, endowing only one 
player with the right to send messages affected neither the likelihood of achieving 
coordination on the socially optimal outcome, nor the frequency of alternation in taking turns. 
Indeed, in the One-Way treatment the social optimum was played in 87% of the observations 
and 77% of the groups took turns. Overall, we show that in complex two-stage coordination 
situations where inequality is unavoidable, communication can alleviate conflicts and increase 
efficiency dramatically provided relative positions can be exchanged in a fair way, and 
regardless of whether communication is unilateral or bilateral.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews briefly the 
related literature. Section 3 describes the theoretical background and the experimental design 
and procedures. Section 4 presents and discusses our results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Related Literature  
While communication in static games has been early and widely studied in experimental 
economics,4 there are much less studies on communication in two-stage games. An exception 
is Andersson and Wengström (2011) who test the impact of pre-play and intra-play 
communication between the stages of the game on cooperation. The payoffs of the game are 
                                                          
4 See Isaac and Plott (1981), Isaac et al. (1984) and Isaac and Walker (1985) for experiments on the impact of 
face-to-face communication on bidding behavior, Ledyard (1995) and Sally (1995) for surveys on 
communication in social dilemmas, Cooper et al. (1992), Crawford (1998), and Blume and Ortman (2007) for 
coordination games, Brandts and Cooper (2007) for weak-link games with a manager and workers, Bochet et al. 
(2006) for public goods games. See Cason and Mui (2014) on the relative impact of repetition and 
communication in an indefinitely repeated divide and conquer game. 
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such that players can sustain cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma played in the first stage by 
threatening to play the inferior equilibrium in a second stage coordination game with Pareto-
ranked multiple equilibria. They find that pre-play communication increases cooperation but 
its effect is significantly reduced when intra-play communication is possible. With the same 
game setting, Cooper and Kuhn (2012) find, however, that adding intra-play communication 
to pre-play communication increases cooperation. This difference may derive from the fact 
that they use written free-form communication, while Andersson and Wengström (2011) 
implemented a structured communication where the only possible contents were the intended 
action choices.  
A major difference with this previous literature is that the equilibrium payoffs of our two-
stage game are asymmetric while in the previous studies payoffs were equal in equilibrium. 
Another difference is that while these studies used two successive different games, in our 
game the second stage is nested in the first one. Indeed, payoffs in the game are determined 
only after the two stages have been completed. Another difference with previous studies is 
that we do not allow players to communicate between the two stages of the game, and we 
compare one-way and two-way communication.  
In our game, successful coordination in the two stages implies that one of the partners has 
to sacrifice part of his earnings. Inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and guilt 
aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) may create disutility if the same player has to 
sacrifice repeatedly. These preferences may motivate players to exchange between the good 
and the bad turn and to respect this rotation between the asymmetric outcomes over time. But 
turn taking may also be a profitable strategy for selfish players who want to establish a 
reputation of fairness in order to get higher payoffs than those obtained in case of conflict. 
The turn taking strategy has been modeled formally by Lau and Mui (2008, 2012) for 
  8 
respectively the battle-of-the-sexes game and for repeated symmetric 2x2 games (including 
chicken, common-pool-resources and prisoner’s dilemma games) (see also Bhaskar, 2000). 
They show that, without communication, a turn taking equilibrium may exist for these classes 
of infinitely repeated games and that the expected time taken to reach such equilibrium 
increases in the degree of conflict between the players. Experimental evidence of turn taking 
has been shown in various repeated games such as a kind of chicken game (Bornstein et al., 
1997), traffic game (Helbing et al., 2005), entry game with incomplete information (Kaplan 
and Ruffle, 2012), and a sequential public good game (Bruttel and Güth, 2013). Using an 
indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger 
experimental design, Cason et al. (2013) show that players use an efficiency-enhancing turn 
taking strategy, learn fast this strategy, and teach it to other players, especially when the degree 
of conflict is lower. We contribute to this literature by considering a game with two nested 
stages, which may make the adoption of turn taking slower. 
Only a few papers have considered turn taking and communication simultaneously as we 
are doing in our study. In a multi-player entry game, Zillante (2011) shows that a multi-period 
signaling device (that differs from free-form communication) facilitates inter-temporal 
cooperation and turn taking outcomes. Evans et al. (2013) find stronger evidence of turn 
taking in finitely repeated coordination games with dominant strategy equilibrium when cheap 
talk is allowed because communication stimulates pro-social behavior. Their results are robust 
to variations in the degree of conflict between players. Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori (2012) have 
shown that the structure of communication matters and that only unrestricted communication 
helps groups to take turn in winning a contest. We extend this literature by comparing one-
way and two-way communication. 
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Finally, we contribute to the literature comparing the efficiency of unilateral to bilateral 
communication in coordination games with unaligned interests between players. This 
literature has shown that one-way communication is more efficient than two-way 
communication because it facilitates coordination between players with conflicting interests, 
notably in games with asymmetric equilibria, whereas the two-way communication is more 
effective when players face strategic uncertainty. For example, Cooper et al. (1989) show that 
one-way communication is more able to improve coordination than two-way communication 
in a battle-of-the sexes game because it serves as a conflict resolution. Interacting two types 
of coordination games with the two communication structures, Cooper et al. (1992) find that 
one-way communication is more able to increase efficiency in games with a cooperative 
strategy whereas the opposite is observed in games with no cooperative strategy in which one 
strategy is less risky, because it serves as a reassurance (see also Ellingsen and Östling, 2010). 
Consistently, in a corporate turnaround game involving a manager and workers, Brandts and 
Cooper (2007) observe that two-way communication between the manager and the workers is 
more able than one-way communication to overcome coordination failures. In contrast, 
however, using a stag hunt game Burton et al. (2005) find that bilateral communication results 
in less frequent coordination on the payoff dominant equilibrium than unilateral 
communication. We contribute to this literature by examining whether endowing only one 
subject with the right to communicate based on his relative performance in a preliminary task 
can increase the ability of groups to take turn in order to reduce inequality across periods, 
compared to a two-way communication environment. Indeed, the player with the right to 
communicate may lead by proposing the other player to adopt a turn-taking strategy and taking 
the bad turn first to credibly signal his strategy. On the other hand, assigning the right to 
communicate not randomly but based on relative performance may encourage the player who 
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gets this right to try to take advantage of his higher status to alternate the relative position in 
the earnings less frequently.  
3. Theoretical background and experimental design and procedures 
3.1. The game  
We consider a two-player two-stage game with observable actions ={1,2}, {ui(s)}2i=1, 
{Si}
2
i=1 where Si is player i’s strategy set and ui: Sr  Sc   gives player i’s utility for each 
profile s of strategies. The game is characterized as a two-stage simultaneous-move game with 
complete but imperfect information. Let us consider the one-shot version of this game. Figure 
1 presents the game with the payoff values used in the experiment.5 
 
Fig. 1 The two-stage coordination game 
In the first stage of the game, both players have to choose simultaneously and 
independently between options A and B. In the second stage of the game, after being informed 
on the other player’s first-stage choice, both players have to choose simultaneously and 
independently between options X and Y in the sub-game determined by the two players’ 
choices in the first stage. Each player has 32 possible strategies: Si={(A,B)  (X,Y)  (X,Y) 
 (X,Y)  (X,Y)}. Sr  Sc results in a set of 1024 strategy profiles.  
The matrix in Figure 1 displays the payoffs for all possible strategies for the row and 
column players. Payoffs are asymmetric in 12 cells out of 16, i.e. except when both players 
                                                          
5 The extensive form of the game can be found in Appendix 1. 
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select the same options in both stages. Symmetric payoffs are smaller than those earned when 
players choose opposite options.6 The lower left and the upper right sub-matrices are 
symmetric, meaning that the same strategy leads to similar payoffs regardless of which player 
implements it. Payoffs are slightly higher in the upper left sub-matrix in comparison to the 
lower right-matrix, giving an advantage to option A in comparison to option B.  
We use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) concept to solve this game. The 
game has five subgames, including four proper subgames. In each proper subgame both 
players have a dominant strategy. The row player’s dominant strategy is option X in the first, 
third and fourth proper subgames, and option Y in the second proper subgame. The column 
player’s dominant strategy is option X in the first, second and fourth proper subgames, and 
option Y in the third one. Each subgame entails a Nash equilibrium that is represented by the 
following action pairs (AXr, AXc), (AYr, BXc), (BXr, AYc) and (BXr, BXc). Applying 
backward induction, we find that only the action pairs (AYr, BXc) (BXr, AYc) are subgame 
perfect. Figure 2 displays the  reduced normal form of the game. 
 
Fig.2. Reduced normal form of the two-stage coordination game 
The pure strategies Nash equilibria of the reduced form game are the action pairs (Ar, Bc), 
(Br, Ac) and the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is given by (xr=2/3Ar + 1/3Br, xc=2/3Ac + 
1/3Bc). The two asymmetric outcomes ((A,B) and (B,A) in Figure 2) maximize total payoffs. 
To sum up, the theoretical analysis of the game shows that players have to choose 
opposite options at both stages in order to earn the maximum possible payoff corresponding 
                                                          
6 Note that this situation is similar to a “price war” which leads both players to earn the lowest possible earnings 
in the whole game.  
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to the SPNE. It is easy to see that the SPNE of the game raise a conflict problem due to the 
asymmetry of payoffs.  
Let us now consider the repeated version of this game. Players may try to solve the 
conflict by means of a turn taking strategy with a randomization in the first period (that can 
be avoided if communication is possible), and then a rotation between the asymmetric 
outcomes, with each player choosing the actions chosen by the other player in the previous 
period. If players do not deviate from this strategy, turn taking may last. Lau and Mui (2012) 
demonstrate how such a strategy profile can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in 
a symmetric infinite horizon repeated game if this strategy profile is unique and symmetric.  
3.2. Experimental design 
The experiment consists of three treatments and we used a between-subject design. 
Baseline treatment 
The Baseline treatment consists of 20 periods of the two-stage coordination game described 
in sub-section 3.1. We pair participants at the beginning of a session and it is made common 
knowledge that pairs remain fixed throughout the session. Using a partner matching protocol 
allows us to study inter-temporal coordination within pairs.  
Each period is constructed as follows. Knowing the whole payoff matrix for the two 
stages of the game, each participant has to choose simultaneously and independently between 
options A and B. Then, after receiving a feedback on the choice of his co-participant, each 
player has to choose between options X and Y. Then, participants are informed on their co-
player’s second choice and payoffs are displayed. Participants have also an opportunity to fill 
out a history table on a sheet of paper to keep track of previous plays and payoffs.  
The communication treatments 
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The Two-Way communication treatment is similar to the Baseline, except that players are 
allowed to exchange free-form messages during one minute at the beginning of the first stage 
of each period, using a chat box. Communication is not permitted between the two stages. 
Messages are free, except for the usual rules requiring the respect of anonymity and decent 
language. This treatment aims at testing whether communication allows individuals to 
coordinate on the SPNE more rapidly and in a higher proportion, in particular by using a turn 
taking strategy.  
In the One-Way treatment, only one player in each pair is allowed to send messages and 
thus communication is limited to 20 seconds. To designate this player, we added a preliminary 
part in which participants have to perform a memory task during five minutes, before receiving 
instructions for the main game.7 The task is not incentivized, but participants are informed 
that their performance will be used to assign roles in the next part of the experiment (without 
being informed on the exact content of the next part). After five minutes, we compare the 
relative performance of participants and divide them into two equal groups. Players are 
informed that the computer program then creates pairs composed of one player with median 
or above-median performance and one player with below-median performance. In each pair, 
the player with above-median performance is allowed to send messages to the other player 
throughout the session. 
These treatments aim at testing whether communication increases the likelihood of the 
SNPE play and whether coordination is improved more by unilateral or by bilateral 
communication. We can also test whether the player who got a higher status in the One-Way 
treatment tries to lead by proposing taking turn and starting with the bad turn to signal his 
                                                          
7 The screen displays the back of sixteen cards and the task is to reform eight pairs with similar pictures by 
clicking on the cards and memorizing their pictures (see snapshots in the instructions in Appendix 2). Once the 
eight pairs are reformed, new cards are displayed on the screen. This task is totally orthogonal to the coordination 
game.  
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good intentions, or whether he tries to keep a higher share of the payoffs by proposing a less 
frequent rotation in turn taking compared to the previous treatment. We acknowledge, 
however, that the One-Way treatment introduces more than one change compared to the Two-
Way treatment, since in addition to allowing one-way communication, it is common 
knowledge that each pair is composed of a more able player and a less able player in the 
memory task, which may help players to coordinate by creating a salient point. We must keep 
this in mind when analyzing our results.8 
Elicitation of individual characteristics 
Individual characteristics may ease or hamper coordination. We have therefore measured 
some of them. In particular, we elicited risk attitudes at the beginning of the sessions, using 
the procedure of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Charness and Gneezy (2012). Each subject is 
endowed with 80 monetary units and has to choose how much to invest (between 0 and 80) in 
a risky investment. With 50% chance the investment returns 2.5 times its amount and with 
50% chance it is lost. A risk neutral expected utility maximizer should invest all his 
endowment, otherwise the individual is classified as risk averse. The participants received a 
feedback on the outcome of the random draw only at the end of the session. At the end of the 
experiment, a demographic questionnaire was also administered, including questions on 
gender, age, and relative wealth of the family compared to other students (on a scale from 0 
for the poorer to 10 for the wealthier).  
3.3. Procedures 
                                                          
8 Indeed, suppose that in all treatments players had to perform this preliminary task and that it is common 
knowledge that in each pair there would be a more able subject and a less able subject. This could have decreased 
the rate of coordination failures in both the Baseline and the Two-Way treatments compared to our current design 
if players had used this characteristic as a coordination device to determine who should start receiving the high 
payoff. Isolating the effect of assigning competence types to players would require additional treatments that we 
leave for further investigation. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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The experiment was conducted at GATE-LAB, Lyon, France. 162 participants were recruited 
from local engineering and business schools, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 50.62% of the 
participants are females. Their mean age is 25 years (S.D.=9.12), their mean relative wealth 
5.14 (S.D.=1.88), and their mean investment in the risky asset is 45.33 (S.D.=22.69) showing 
evidence of risk aversion. Three sessions per treatment were organized, with 56, 44, and 62 
participants in the Baseline, the Two-Way, and the One-Way treatments, respectively. The 
experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a computer after drawing a tag from 
an opaque bag. Sets of instructions were distributed after each part and read aloud. The payoff 
matrix (Fig.1) was distributed with the instructions (see Appendix 2). To facilitate its reading, 
each player was identified with a color (red for the row player and blue for the column player). 
In addition, we displayed the whole matrix at the beginning of each first stage and the relevant 
sub-matrix at the beginning of each second stage on the computer screens. Therefore, subjects 
had in front of them all relevant information when making their decisions. The understanding 
of participants was checked by means of a questionnaire and all questions were answered in 
private.  
On average a session lasted 90 minutes, including payment. The participants were paid 
the sum of their earnings in each period in addition to their earnings from the risk elicitation 
task, at the rate of 1 experimental currency unit = 0.05 Euro. In addition, they were paid a €4 
show-up fee. On average, participants earned €17.20 (S.D.=3.30). Payments were made 
individually in cash and in private in a separate room. 
4. Results  
In this section, we first examine the extent to which groups have been able to coordinate on 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by differentiating their choices in each stage of the 
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game, depending on whether communication, unilateral or bilateral, was allowed or not. 
Second, we explore the use of two specific coordination strategies within pairs throughout the 
game: turn taking and submission. 
4.1. Coordination on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
We define coordination as a situation in which the two players select opposite options at 
both stages of the game. To study how groups coordinate, we focus on the following three 
situations. First, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that requires that the two players 
choose opposite options in the two stages of the game: they play A and B in the first stage and 
Y and X, respectively, in the second stage (which corresponds to their dominant strategy in 
the symmetric subgames two and three, see Figure 1). Second, the situation when the two 
players fail to coordinate in the first stage (both play A or B) and play their dominant strategy 
in the second stage (both choose X, which corresponds to playing the Nash equilibrium in 
subgames one and four), which leads both subjects to jointly earn the lowest possible payoffs. 
The third relevant situation might be considered as a fallback situation and it occurs when the 
two players make the same choice in the first stage (both play A or B) but do not play the 
Nash equilibrium in subgames one and four (both choose Y), in order to attain the Pareto 
optimal outcome in these subgames. In this last case, both subjects earn a slightly higher 
payoff than that obtained when playing the Nash Equilibrium. 
Only a few groups, after selecting opposite options in the first-stage of the game, opted 
for identical options in the second stage (6.61% of the groups in the Baseline, 4.10% in Two-
Way and 4.83% in One-Way). It is clear that the first-stage choices are crucial to the success 
of coordination in pairs. This is why we first report the analysis of behavior in the first stage 
before analyzing the data for the two stages taken together. 
Differentiation in the first stage of the game 
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In the first stage of the Baseline, both players choose option A in 32.86% of the cases (184 
/560 pairs*periods) and both choose option B in only 7.14% of the cases (40 /560 
pairs*periods). Both players’ preference for option A is not surprising since it allows them to 
avoid the proper game that leads to the lowest payoffs (the lower right proper subgame in 
Figure 1). Thus, players are able to differentiate in only 60% of the observations (336/560 
pairs*periods) by choosing AB or BA, which is a condition for reaching the SPNE. This 
reveals a high rate of coordination failures when communication is not possible. 
The picture changes dramatically when communication is introduced. Indeed, the two 
players are able to differentiate in 90% of the cases (396/440) in the Two-Way treatment and 
in 92.17% of the cases (553/600) in the One-Way treatment. The mean percentage of 
differentiated first-stage choices is significantly different in both the Two-Way and the One-
Way treatments compared to the Baseline (two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests –MW, hereafter- 
with each pair’s choices averaged over the 20 periods as an independent observation; p<0.001 
in both treatments).9 There is no significant difference between the two treatments with 
communication (p=0.918): efficiency improves as soon as communication is introduced, 
regardless of the number of players allowed to communicate.  
Both players choose option A in only 7.05% (31/440) and 6.5% (39/600) of the 
observations in the Two-Way and One-Way treatments, respectively. Again, these 
percentages are significantly different from those in the Baseline (p<0.001 in both cases), but 
they do not differ from each other (p=0.977). The percentages of choices of option B by both 
players are respectively 2.95% (13/440) and 1.33% (8/600). These percentages do differ 
statistically from those in the Baseline (p=0.016 and p=0.003, respectively) and but not from 
                                                          
9 Unless specified otherwise, all the non-parametric tests reported in this paper are two-tailed and each pair 
averaged across all periods give one independent observation. 
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each other (p=0.943). Thus, when they can discuss on a strategy (Two-Way treatment) or 
communicate a strategy (One-Way treatment), players are most of the time able to implement 
the first condition for reaching the SPNE. 
Individuals learn over time to differentiate their choice in the first stage of the game but 
learning is quicker when communication is possible. The three panels of Figure 3 display for 
each treatment the evolution of the distribution of first-stage choices in the pairs, by blocks of 
five periods.10  
 
a) Baseline treatment 
 
                 b) Two-Way treatment                               c) One-Way treatment 
Figure 3. Distribution of first-stage pairs’ choices, by block of periods and by treatment 
 
Figure 3a shows that in the Baseline treatment, players are more likely to differentiate 
their first-stage decision in the last ten periods compared to the first ten. Only three groups 
                                                          
10 For more detailed information, Figures A1, A2 and A3 in Appendix 3 display the distribution of first-stage 
choices between A and B for each pair and each period, for each treatment respectively.  
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were able to start differentiating their first stage choices in the first three periods and continued 
throughout the game. Wilcoxon tests (W, hereafter) at the pair level indicate significant 
differences between the first ten and the last ten periods in the mean percentages of 
differentiated choices (p=0.004), choice of option A by both players (p=0.011), and choice of 
option B by both (p=0.067). However, even in the last block of five periods, there are still 
30% of the pairs that are not able to coordinate on opposite choices. In the absence of 
communication, it takes time for the players to learn differentiating their action. It is a standard 
result in coordination games but the difficulty is stronger here since one player has to accept 
to earn less in the anticipation of the second stage. 
Learning occurs also in the communication treatments but it is more immediate. 
Wilcoxon tests indicate significant differences between the first ten and the last ten periods in 
the mean percentages of differentiated choices in the Two-Way and in the One-Way treatment 
(p=0.002 and p=0.018, respectively). In the Two-Way treatment we find significant 
differences in the mean percentages of choice of option A by both players (p=0.001), but not 
in the mean percentages of joint choice of option B (p=0.392). The opposite results are found 
in the One-Way treatment (p=0.143 and p=0.005, respectively). If learning occurs, 17 groups 
out of 22 in the Two-Way treatment and 23 groups out of 31 in the One-Way treatment were 
already able to make opposite first-stage choices in the first three periods.  
Overall coordination 
First-stage choices are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the achievement of 
coordination. Even if only few groups failed to reach the SPNE after starting with opposite 
options, the anticipation of the consequences of the second-stage choices on the payoffs 
influcences first-stage decisions. Table 1 displays the distribution of these situations by 
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treatment and by block of five periods, as we expect some learning to occur.11 It also displays 
the results of non parametric statistics comparing each treatment with communication to the 
Baseline, conducted for each of the four breakdowns of results. 
Table 1. Summary statistics on the choice of options in the two stages, by treatment and block 
of periods 




Different options in both stages 
(SPNE) (AY and BX. BX and AY) 
   Periods 1-5 (%) 
   Periods 6-10 (%) 
   Periods 11-15 (%) 



















Same option in stage 1 (A or B) + 
Nash equilibrium in stage 2 (X) 
   Periods 1-5 (%) 
   Periods 6-10 (%) 
   Periods 11-15 (%) 



















Same option in stage 1 (A or B) + 
Optimum in stage 2 (Y) 
   Periods 1-5 (%) 
   Periods 6-10 (%) 
   Periods 11-15 (%) 





















   Periods 1-5 (%) 
   Periods 6-10 (%) 
   Periods 11-15 (%) 



















Total  100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
Note: The table displays the percentages represented by each category of situation. The total number of 
observations is 560 in the Baseline treatment, 440 in the Two-Way communication treatment and 620 in the 
One-Way communication treatment. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels 
respectively, and ns indicates no significance in two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
(KS, hereafter) in which we compare each treatment to the Baseline treatment. Each pair of subjects gives only 
one independent observation. The only case in which the significance level obtained from a two-tailed 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test differs from the level obtained with a two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests is relative to the 
choice of the same option in stage 1 (A or B) and of the optimum in stage 2 when comparing the One-Way 
treatment to the Baseline; the non-significance in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is indicated in parentheses. 
                                                          
11 For more detailed information, Figures B1, B2 and B3 in Appendix 3 display the strategies played by each 
pair of subjects in each period, for each treatment respectively. 
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Table 1 shows that the players are able to coordinate on the SPNE in only 53.39% of the 
cases. When they are not able to differentiate their choices in the first stage, they are more 
likely to play the Nash equilibrium of the sub-game than the optimum (20.71% vs. 5%, 
respectively).  
In contrast, communication makes coordination on the SPNE significantly more likely 
than in the Baseline (MW and KS tests, p<0.001 in both the Two-Way and One-Way 
treatments). Indeed, pairs are able to coordinate in 85.68% and 86.61% of the cases in the 
Two-Way and the One-Way treatments, respectively (MW and KS tests, p=0.949 and 
p=0.661, respectively). While the percentage of pairs that played the SPNE more than 10 
periods in total was only 14% in the Baseline, it is 91% in the Two-Way treatment and 90% 
in the One-Way treatment. When pairs made the same choice in the first stage, players play 
also significantly differently the Nash equilibrium in the second stage compared to the 
Baseline (MW and KS tests, p<0.001 in both treatments). Indeed, this characterizes only 
2.50% and 2.90% of the observations in the Two-Way and One-way treatments, respectively. 
A weak difference is found in the choice of the optimum in the second stage in pairwise 
comparisons for the One-Way treatment (MW and KS tests, p=0.056 and p=0.409, 
respectively) but not in the Two-Way treatment (MW and KS test, p=0.458 and p=0.844, 
respectively). Finally, while there were more than 20% of the observations that could not be 
characterized in the Baseline, this represents less than 10% of the observations in the 
treatments with communication (MW tests, p=0.006 and p=0.004 respectively, and KS tests, 
p=0.002 and p=0.001, respectively). 
Table 1 also reveals that some learning occurs. In the Baseline, the SPNE is played 
36.43% of the time during the first five periods. This percentage increases to 46.43% in 
periods 6 to 10 and 62.86% in periods 11 to 15 to stabilize at 67.86% towards the end of the 
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game. Pairs are significantly more likely to play the SPNE in the second part of the game than 
in the first one (W test, p=0.004). However, even in the last block of five periods, the number 
of pairs playing the SPNE remains different compared to both the Two-Way and the One-
Way treatments (MW test, p=0.004 and p<0.001, respectively, and KS test, p=0.001 in both 
treatments). 
Coordination is much faster with communication. Indeed, in the Two-Way treatment the 
SPNE is already played 73.64% of the time in the first five periods and 68% of the pairs played 
the SPNE continuously after the third period. In the One-Way treatment the SPNE is already 
played in 68.39% of the time in the first five periods and among the 23 pairs who chose 
opposite options in the first stage, 22 selected also opposite options in the second stage in the 
first three periods. The SPNE is played in 92% of the cases in each of the three following 
blocks of periods. This indicates that endowing only one player with the right to communicate 
does not speed up coordination on the SPNE play. Pairs are also significantly more likely to 
play the SPNE in the second part of the game than in the first one (W test, p=0.002 in the 
Two-Way treatment, and p=0.018 in the One-Way treatment). 
To complement this analysis, we now report the results of an econometric analysis. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of Probit models in which the dependent variable is the 
probability for a pair of subjects to play the SPNE. Standard errors are clustered at the pair 
level since groups are fixed throughout the session. Model (1) pools the data of all treatments, 
model (2) considers the data from the Baseline, and model (3) the data from the treatments 
with communication. In model (1) the independent variables include dummies for treatments 
(the Baseline is the reference category). Model (3) includes a dummy variable for the One-
Way treatment. In all models, the independent variables include a time trend and various mean 
individual characteristics of the pairs. These characteristics include the number of females in 
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the pair, the mean wealth, the within-pair difference in wealth, the mean risk index and the 
within-pair difference in the risk index. Indeed, players with different characteristics matched 
in the same pair may possibly coordinate more easily. Table 2 reports marginal effects.  
Table 2. Determinants of the play of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 










One-Way Treatment  
Period 
Number of females in the pair 
Mean relative wealth 
Within-pair difference in 
wealth 
Mean risk attitude 













































Note: Marginal effects of a Probit model in which the dependent variable is probability for a pair of subjects to 
play the SPNE are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the pair level. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
The regressions reported in Table 2 confirm that the likelihood to play the SPNE is 
significantly higher in the two treatments with communication (model (1)). This result is in 
accordance with the literature showing that communication considerably increases the 
likelihood of coordination on an efficient equilibrium (Cooper et al., 1992; Blume and 
Ortmann, 2007; Brandts and Cooper, 2007). Interestingly, model (3) shows that allowing only 
one player to communicate to propose a strategy and assigning this status based on relative 
performance instead of permitting bilateral discussions do not affect the likelihood for a pair 
to play the SPNE. The significant effect of the time trend shows evidence of learning within 
pairs. The marginal effect is especially large in the Baseline (model (2)). In addition, we find 
that pairs with more females are more likely to play the SPNE when communication is not 
available but not when communication is possible. A lower mean risk aversion increases the 
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probability of playing the SPNE in communication treatments and when data of all treatments 
are pooled but the difference in the degree of risk aversion in the pair has no effect. 
Result 1: In a two-stage game where the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium requires that the 
two players make opposite choices in both stages and accept unequal payoffs, only half of the 
pairs are able to coordinate in the absence of communication. 
Result 2: Communication increases dramatically the probability of pairs to play the SPNE, 
regardless of whether it is unilateral or bilateral.  
 
4.2 Turn taking and submission 
In this last sub-section we examine two possible coordination strategies in pairs: turn taking 
and submission. Turn taking means that players exchange the bad turn (choosing option B that 
yields a payoff of 8 ECU) and the good turn (choosing option A that yields a payoff of 12 
ECU) repeatedly (every period, every two, four, five or even after 10 periods). We impose 
that the strategy is observed for at least 10 periods to characterize the pair of players as turn 
takers. Submission is the opposite of turn taking: one pair member always keeps the bad turn 
for himself and leaves the good turn to his partner.  
In the Baseline treatment, turn taking remains seldom and is applied by only 5 pairs out 
of 28 (17.86%) continuously for at least 10 periods until the end of the game.12 One of these 
pairs was able to implement this strategy from the second period. On the opposite, two pairs 
play the SPNE repeatedly but never exchange turns, one player dominating the other one who 
makes an attempt to change turns but gives up rapidly.  
Communication undeniably improves the probability of turn taking. This is expected 
since by exchanging messages, players can teach, learn, and reinforce this strategy. The great 
majority of pairs take turns during at least 10 periods when communication is allowed (90.90% 
                                                          
12 For more detailed information, Figures C1, C2 and C3 in Appendix 3 display the strategies played by each 
subject within each pair in each period, for each treatment respectively. 
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and 77.41% of the pairs in the Two-Way and the One-Way treatments, respectively). These 
proportions are both significantly different from that in the Baseline (proportion tests, 
p<0.001), but not significantly different from each other (p=0.305). In the Two-Way 
treatment, 20 pairs out of 22 have continuously exchanged their turns. Among these 20 pairs, 
18 have exchanged their turns after each period and only two pairs exchanged turns after 10 
periods. We do not find evidence of domination- submission in this treatment. 
In the One-Way treatment, 24 pairs out of 31 have continuously exchanged their turns in 
at least 10 periods.13 Most of the groups exchange the good and bad turn after each period, 
showing no evidence of deceptive behavior. The message sender monopolizes the good turn 
in only three pairs, seeming to exploit his higher status, and the player who cannot send a 
message accepts this submission without trying to punish his partner. The study of the 
communication content shows that in one pair the message sender betrayed his partner, by 
making him believe that he would give him the good turn after 10 periods, what he eventually 
did not. In two pairs, turn taking occurred not every period but after a first block of 10 periods. 
This obviously requires that the player who takes the first bad turn trusts the other player. This 
is why the message sender in both groups started with the bad turn, in order to make his 
message more credible. This suggests a leadership-by-sacrifice. 
The average difference of payoffs in absolute value between the treatments is 3.05, 3.93 
and 3.98 ECU in respectively the Baseline, Two-Way and One-Way. Mann-Whitney tests 
indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the Baseline and the 
communication treatments (MW tests, Baseline vs. Two-Way p=0.001, Baseline vs. One-Way 
p<0,001) but that there is no difference betweent the two communication treatement (MW 
                                                          
13 Relaxing the definition by considering that players use turn taking when they alternate continuously during at 
least five periods instead of 10 does not make a difference: only 6 pairs out of 28 correspond to this larger 
definition in the Baseline, 21 out of 22 in the Two-Way treatment and 27 out of 31 in the One-Way treatment. 
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test, p=0.796). Communication helps individual equalize long term payoffs by rotation 
between the good and the bad turn. Even if the mean duration of the turn taking strategy for 
those groups who are able to implement it during at leat 10 periods without any interruption 
is 16.20 periods in the Baseline, 17.40 in the Two-Way treatment and 18.70 in the One-Way 
treatment pairwise Mann-Whitney tests show that the mean duration in the Baseline is 
significantly different compared to both the Two-Way and the One-Way treatments (MW 
tests, p<0.001 in both) but there is no difference between the two communication treatments 
(MW test, p=0.386). This suggests that communication is not only crucial to initiate this 
strategy but also to sustain it.  
To further investigate the determinants of turn taking we estimate Probit models in which 
the dependent variable takes value 1 if the pair has played a turn taking strategy for at least 10 
periods in a row, and 0 otherwise. One pair gives only one observation in these models. Model 
(1) is for the whole sample, model (2) restricts the sample to the Baseline treatment and model 
(3) to the treatments with communication. For consistency, we add the same independent 
variables as in the regressions reported in Table 2, except for the time trend. Table 3 reports 
marginal effects.  
Table 3. Determinants of the probability of pairs to use turn taking in at least 10 periods 
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Note: Marginal effects of Probit regressions in which the dependent variable is the fact that the pair takes turn in 
at least 10 periods are reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
 
Table 3 confirms that the two communication treatments significantly increase the 
probability of turn taking. In model (1)), a t-test comparing the two coefficients shows that 
there is no significant difference between the coefficients of the two communication 
treatments. (p=0.380). Interestingly, model (3) indicates that pairs in which players are less 
risk averse have greater probability of turn taking.  
To sum up, we have the following findings. 
Result 3: In a two-stage game with a SPNE with asymmetric payoffs, less than one fifth of 
pairs use a turn taking strategy when no communication is allowed. 
Result 4: Communication increases the ability of players to implement durably a turn taking 
strategy to coordinate on the SPNE, regardless of whether communication is unilateral or 
bilateral.  
Result 5: Communication is more crucial to initiate a turn taking strategy of coordination than 
to sustain it.  
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Our laboratory experiment investigates how individuals can coordinate in a two-stage game 
that captures some real features, like investment in infrastructure and fiscal competition 
between regions or vertical differentiation between firms. The literature has shown how 
frequent are coordination failures in one-stage games, and how communication can help 
individuals to coordinate, notably by implementing strategies like turn taking in order to 
reduce long-term payoff inequality. Our contribution is to study whether communication has 
the same ability to overcome coordination failures in a two-stage game where the Subgame 
Perfect Nash Equilibrium requires that the two players make opposite choices in both stages 
and accept unequal payoffs. 
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We find that coordination failures occur in almost half of the time and less than one fifth 
of pairs use a turn taking strategy to alleviate long-term payoff inequality. Communication 
increases dramatically coordination on the SPNE. This results from the fact that it increases 
the ability of players to initiate a turn taking strategy between the players. Its impacts is also 
important in sustaining it. By communicating together subjects were able to establish a long-
lasting strategy that allowed them to increase efficiency and decrease inequality by 
exchanging their relative positions in a fair way. Our results show that communication is able 
to solve coordination conflicts even in more complex situations than in the one-stage games 
usually studied until now because players are able to teach and learn the turn taking strategy 
and because most of them do not try to betray their partner. 
Finally, the probability of using turn taking and the ability to coordinate on the SPNE do 
not depend on whether communication is unilateral or bilateral. The success of coordination 
in a high proportion of cases has been observed with the two communication structures. This 
is an intriguing result because, based on the previous literature, we expected to observe less 
coordination failures in the One-Way treatment than in the Two-Way treatment because 
unilateral communication can serve as a conflict resolution. This similarity of outcomes can 
result from the fact that bilateral communication has been able to solve the conflict because it 
allowed players to elaborate a turn taking strategy to avoid coordination failures and to 
reinforce this strategy over time. This has been made possible because most players did not 
consider each period independently of the other periods. Unilateral communication has also 
been efficiency-enhancing because most players who were assigned the right to communicate 
did not exploit their higher status by trying to impose playing the SPNE in their favor 
repeatedly. In the One-Way treatment in one fourth (25,81%) of the pairs the player allowed 
to send messages was also the one that started with the bad turn, giving a signal of his 
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willingness to initiate turn taking, which represents a sort of leadership by sacrifice (in terms 
of risk taking if the partner did not take turn in the next period). Observing that most of these 
players did not try to take advantage of their relative status suggests that our results would not 
have been very different if assigning the right to communicate randomly instead of based on 
relative performance in a preliminary task.    
A natural extension of this research could aim at determining the frontiers of positive 
communication effects on conflict resolution. This would require strengthening the difficulty 
of finding a consensus in our two-stage game, for example by introducing a stronger conflict 
in the second stage of the game, by reducing the number of periods with communication, or 
by using a random matching protocol instead of a partner mathing protocol. On the other side, 
introducing a differentiation between the two members of a pair in the treatment without 
communication, based for example on relative performance in a preliminary independent task, 
could test whether status facilitates coordination. The payoff structure could be modified such 
that the subgame perfect Nash equilibium no longer corresponds to the social optimum. 
Finally, the decisions could be made partially or completely irreversible so that the application 
of turn taking would become more complicated.  
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Appendix 2 Instructions (translated from French) 
The following instructions are for the Baseline treatment. We add the instructions that are specific to 
the communication treatments in italics into brackets. The instructions for the additional part of the 
One-Way treatment are shown after the instructions for the other treatments. 
General information 
We thank you for participating in this experiment in economics. Your payoffs depend on your 
decisions. It is therefore important that you read the following instructions carefully. 
Instructions are distributed for your personal use. We thank you for not communicating with other 
participants during the experiment unless you are invited to do so. All your decisions are anonymous: 
you will never enter your name into the computer during the experiment. 
The experiment is divided into two independent parts. [This sentence is replaced by the following 
in the One-Way treatment: The experiment is divided into three parts. The first part is 
independent of the following parts.] First, we will explain the first part. Once the first part is 
completed, you will receive detailed information for the second part. 
During the experiment, we will not talk about Euros but about ECU (Experimental Currency Units). 
All payoffs will be calculated in ECU. The conversion rate between ECU and Euros is: 
100 ECU = 5 Euros 
At the end of the experiment, the total number of ECU that you earned in each part will be converted 
into Euros. In addition to this amount, you will receive a show up fee of 4 Euros. 
All payments will be made in private and in cash in a separate room. Other participants will never 
know the amount of your payoffs in this experiment. 
Part 1 
Description of the task 
You will receive 80 ECU. We ask you to choose an amount in ECU (between 0 and 80 ECU included) 
that you are willing to invest in a risky asset. You keep for yourself the ECU that are not invested. 
The investment 
There is one chance out of two that the investment is a success. 
If this is a success, you will receive two and a half times the amount you have invested. 
If the investment is not a success, you will lose the amount you invested. 
1st example: You invest 0 ECU. You earn: (80-0) = 80 ECU. 
2nd example: You invest 40 ECU. If the investment is a success, you earn (80 - 40) + 2.5*40 = 140. 
If the investment is not a success, you earn (80-40) + 0 = 40 ECU. 
3rd example: You invest 80 ECU. If the investment is a success, you earn (80 - 80) + 2.5*80 = 200. If 
the investment is not a success, you earn (80-80) + 0 = 0 ECU. 
How do we determine if the investment is a success? 
We ask you to choose a color: black or white. 
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select one of these two colors. Each 
color has the same chance of being selected.  
If the randomly selected color is the one you have chosen, the investment is a success. 
If the randomly selected color is not the one you have chosen, the investment is not a success. 
You will be informed of your payoff in this first part only at the end of the session. 
  35 
To sum up: You have to choose now the amount you wish to invest and the color. At the end of the 
session, the program will randomly select a color for all the participants and it will indicate to you the 
color randomly selected as well as your payoff for this part that will be added to your payoffs of the 
second part. 
Please read these instructions. If you have any question about these instructions, please raise your hand 
and we will answer these questions in private. 
Part 2 (distributed after completion of Part 1) 
This part includes 20 independent periods. 
Before the beginning of the first period, the computer program will randomly divide the participants 
in this session between Red participants and Blue participants. There are as many Red participants as 
Blue participants. 
During these 20 periods, you will be either a Blue participant or a Red participant. You will keep the 
same color throughout the whole session. You will be informed of your color before the beginning of 
the first period. 
At the beginning of this part, the computer program will form pairs composed of a Blue participant 
and a Red participant. You will be randomly paired with another participant in this session who has a 
different color from yours. You will remain paired with the same co-participant during the 20 periods. 
You will never know the identity of your co-participant. 
Description of each period 
Each period consists of two stages. During each of the two stages you will have to choose between 
two options. 
[Two-Way treatment: At the beginning of each period, before starting the first stage, you can 
communicate with your co-participant. A dialog box will appear on your screen for this 
purpose. For a maximum of 1 minute, you can use this box to exchange messages with your 
co-participant. Your messages should not include information that identifies you or your co-
participant. They must not contain rude language or threats. 
If you want to stop the communication before the minute has elapsed, press the "OK" button. 
Once you or your co-participant press the "OK" button, the dialog box is no longer available 
and the next screen appears at the same time for both co-participants. As soon as one of you 
press the "OK" button it is no longer possible to send messages. If you do not press the "OK" 
button, the dialog box closes automatically after one minute, and the next screen appears. ] 
Stage 1 
You have to choose between option A and option B. Your co-participant also chooses between these 
two options simultaneously. 
Once you and your co-participant have made your choices, you will be informed of the choice of your 
co-participant and your co-participant will be informed of your choice. 
Stage 2 
You have to choose between option X and option Y. Your co-participant also chooses between these 
two options simultaneously. 
Once you and your co-participant have made your choices, you will be informed of the choice of your 
co-participant and your co-participant will be informed of your choice. You are then informed of your 
payoff and of the payoff of your co-participant. The period ends and another period starts 
automatically. 
Calculation of payoffs  
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Your payoffs and the payoffs of your co-participant in the period depend on the choices between 
options A and B and between options X and Y. Table 1, in the attached sheet, represents all possible 
payoffs in a period. Please refer to this table. 
Table 1 shows in red the choice (A, B, X, Y) and the possible payoffs of the Red participant in the 
period. It shows in blue the choices (A, B, X, Y) and the possible payoffs of the Blue participant in the 
period. 
At the end of stage 1, one of the following four situations is possible: 
- Both participants chose option A 
- Both participants chose option B 
- The Red participant chose option A and the Blue participant chose option B 
- The Red participant chose option B and the Blue participant chose option A. 
At the beginning of stage 2, only one of the 4 panels of Table 1 will be used to determine your payoffs 
for the period given your choice and the choice of your co-participant between options X and Y. We 
describe below the four possible cases, each case refers to a table in the attached sheet. 
a) If both participants chose option A in stage 1, Table 2 describes the possible payoffs given the 
choices made between X and Y in stage 2. Please refer to it. 
Table 2 reproduces the North West panel of Table 1. Four situations are possible at the end of stage 2: 
- Both participants chose option X. The Red participant earns 3 ECU and the Blue participant earns 3 
ECU. 
- Both participants chose option Y. The Red participant earns 4 ECU and the Blue participant earns 4 
ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option X and the Blue participant chose option Y. The Red participant 
earns 5 ECU and the Blue participant earns 2 ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option Y and the Blue participant chose option X. The Red participant 
earns 2 ECU and the Blue participant earns 5 ECU. 
 
b) If both participants chose option B in stage 1, Table 3 describes the possible payoffs given the 
choices made between X and Y in stage 2.  
Table 3 reproduces the South East panel of Table 1. Four situations are possible at the end of stage 2: 
- Both participants chose option X. The Red participant earns 2 ECU and the Blue participant earns 2 
ECU. 
- Both participants chose option Y. The Red participant earns 3 ECU and the Blue participant earns 3 
ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option X and the Blue participant chose option Y. The Red participant 
earns 4 ECU and the Blue participant earns 1 ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option Y and the Blue participant chose option X. The Red participant 
earns 1 ECU and the Blue participant earns 4 ECU. 
 
c) If the Red participant chose Option A and the Blue participant chose option B, Table 4 
describes the possible payoffs given the choices made between X and Y in stage 2. 
Table 4 reproduces the North East panel of Table 1. Four situations are possible at the end of stage 2: 
- Both participants chose option X. The Red participant earns 8 ECU and the Blue participant earns 5 
ECU. 
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- Both participants chose option Y. The Red participant earns 14 ECU and the Blue participant earns 
5 ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option X and the Blue participant chose option Y. The Red participant 
earns  9 ECU and the Blue participant earns 4 ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option Y and the Blue participant chose option X. The Red participant 
earns 12 ECU and the Blue participant earns 8 ECU. 
d) If the Red participant chose option B and the Blue participant chose option A, Table 5 
describes the possible payoffs given choices made between X and Y in stage 2. 
Table 5 reproduces the South West panel of Table 1. Four situations are possible at the end of stage 2: 
- Both participants chose option X. The Red participant earns 5 ECU and the Blue participant earns 8 
ECU. 
- Both participants chose option Y. The Red participant earns 5 ECU and the Blue participant earns 14 
ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option X and the Blue participant chose option Y. The Red participant 
earns 8 ECU and the Blue participant earns 12 ECU. 
- The Red participant chose option Y and the Blue participant chose option X. The Red participant 
earns 4 ECU and the Blue participant earns 9 ECU. 
At the end of stage 2, you will be informed of the choice of your co-participant, of your payoff and of 
the payoff of your co-participant in this period. The next period will start automatically. 
You have at your disposal on your desk a history table that allows you to take notes on your decisions 
and the decisions of your co-participant and on the associated payoffs in each period. 
End of the part 
At the end of the 20 periods, you will be informed of your total payoff in this part. Your total payoff 
in this part is the sum of your payoffs in each of the 20 periods. 
Then, a final questionnaire will appear on your screen. Afterwards, you will be informed when to go 
to the payment room. 
---- 
Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, raise your hand and we will answer to 
your questions in private. Thank you to fill out the understanding questionnaire that has been 
distributed. We will come to you to check your answers in private. 
---- 
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Table 1. Payoffs with options A, B, X and Y at the beginning of stage 1 
 
 
Table 2. Payoffs with options X and Y when both participants chose A in stage 1 
 
 
Table 3. Payoffs with options X and Y when both participants chose B in stage 1 
 
 
Table 4. Payoffs with options X and Y when Red chose A and Blue chose B in stage 1 
 
 
Table 5. Payoffs with options X and Y when Red chose B and Blue chose A in stage 1 
 
 
 X  Y  X  Y
X 3  ;  3 5  ;  2 8  ;  5 9  ;  4
 Y 2  ;  5 4  ;  4 12  ;  8 14  ;  5
X 5  ;  8 8  ;  12 2  ;  2 4  ;  1
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Instructions for the additional Part 2 and for Part 3 in the One Way Communication 
Part 2 
In this part, we ask you to perform a task. Your score in this task will be compared to the scores of the 
other participants and it will be used to determine your role in the next part, as explained below. 
Description of the task 
At the beginning of this part your screen will show 16 black rectangles, as shown in the figure below: 
 
 
On the screen, the 16 black rectangles hide 8 pairs of identical images. The task is to reform a 
maximum of pairs of identical images for a period of 5 minutes. You score 1 point each time you form 
a pair of identical images, as shown in the figure below. 
 
 
To see the image that hides behind a black rectangle, press the gray button to the left of the black 
rectangle. The first uncovered image remains visible while you are uncovering a second image. You 
can press gray buttons as many times as you want but you can only see two images at once. 
If the two images you just uncovered are not identical, they disappear again behind black rectangles 
after half a second. When two identical images are displayed at the same time, your score increases by 
1 point and the 2 identical images remain permanently visible. To facilitate the search for pairs of 
identical images, you should try to memorize the images already uncovered behind the black 
rectangles. 
Once you have uncovered the 8 pairs of images on the screen, a new screen appears with the same 
images, but arranged randomly in a different way. These images include a ball, a die, two kinds of 
butterflies, two types of bottles and two kinds of leaves. 
Your total score in this part is given by the number of pairs of identical images you have been able to 
reform during 5 minutes. 
To familiarize yourself with the task, you will have the chance to train for two minutes. At the end of 
this training period, the part will start automatically. 
Relative performance 
  40 
At the end of this part the computer program will compare the scores of the participants in the room. 
It will define two groups according to the scores. One group will be composed of the half of 
participants who have the highest scores and the other group will be composed of the half of 
participants who have the lowest scores. Depending on your score you will be assigned to one of the 
two groups and your role will be different in the third part of this experiment. Please read again these 
instructions. If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer to you in private. 
Part 3 (distributed after completion of Part 2) 
This part includes 20 independent periods. 
At the beginning of this part, the computer program will form pairs. You will be randomly paired with 
another participant in this session. You will remain paired with the same co-participant during the 20 
periods. You will never know the identity of your co-participant. 
Within each pair, one of the participants will be able to send messages to the other participant at the 
beginning of each period. It is always the same participant who will be able to send messages to the 
other. 
To determine the participants who can send the messages, the computer program rank participants in 
this session based on the scores achieved in part 2. It forms two groups of equal size according to the 
scores achieved. Participants who belong to the group that made the highest scores in Part 2 will be 
allowed to send messages to their co-participant who belongs to the other group. 
In addition, before the beginning of the first period, the computer program will randomly divide the 
participants in this session between Red and Blue participants. There are as many Red participants as 
Blue participants. Each pair consists of a Red participant and a Blue participant. Thus, during these 20 
periods, you will either be a Blue participant or a Red participant. You will keep the same color 
throughout the session. In the pair, the participant who can send messages to the other participant can 
be either the Red participant or the Blue participant. The color assignment is independent of the ability 
to send messages. 
You will be informed of your color before the beginning of the first period. The program will also 
inform you whether you are or not allowed to send messages to your co-participant, as explained 
below. 
Description of each period 
Each period consists of two stages. During each of the two stages you will have to choose between 
two options. 
At the beginning of each period, before starting the first stage, if you are the participant who can send 
messages to your co-participant, you can communicate with your co-participant. A dialog box 
will appear on your screen for this purpose. For a maximum of 20 seconds, you can use this 
box to send messages to your co-participant. Messages should not include information that 
identifies you or your co-participant. They must not contain rude language or threats. 
If you want to stop the communication before the 20 seconds have elapsed, press the "OK" button. 
Once you have pressed the "OK" button, the dialog box is no longer available and the next screen 
appears at the same time for both co-participants. If you do not press the "OK" button, the dialog box 
closes automatically after 20 seconds, and the next screen appears. 
If you are the participant who is not allowed to send a message to your co-participant, you will see 
your co-participant’s messages appear in the dialog box on your screen. However, you cannot respond. 
The rest of the instructions is similar to the other treatments. 
Appendix 3. Figures of pair decisions 
Figure A1.  Mean first stage choices between A and B, by pair and by period, Baseline 




Note: This graph displays the first-stage choices of each pair in each of the 20 periods. Choosing A corresponds 
to 1, choosing B corresponds to 0. Thus, a mean choice between A and B equal to 0.5 means that the two players 
in the pair have chosen opposite options.  
 






Figure A3.  Mean first stage choices between A and B, by pair and by period,  
One-Way treatment 
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Note: This graph displays the two-stage strategy of each pair in each of the 20 periods. The values on the scale 
are arbitrary. Value 10 means that the pair chose opposite options in both the first and the second stages; they 
played the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Value 6 means the two pair members have chosen the same option 
in the first stage and they played Pareto optimally in the second stage instead of following their dominant 
strategy. Value 3 indicates that after choosing the same option in the first stage, the two pair members played 





Figure B2: Mean strategies in the two stages, by pair and by period,  
Two-Way-Communication 














 Figure C1.  Turn taking strategy, by pair and by period, Baseline 
 
 
Note: This graph displays the strategy played by each subject taken individually in the 20 periods. There are two graphs for each pair, one for each player (for example, 
the first two charts correspond to player 1 and player 2 in pair 1). Value 1 means that the subject played the good turn in the period (choice of A). Value 0 indicates that 
the subject has played the bad turn (choice of B). To see which coordination strategy the pair members have used in a period, two graphs must be considered at the same 
time. Only 5 pairs (3, 9, 11, 19, and 21) out of 28 exchanged their turns. On the opposite, in pair 6 subjects never changed their turns. 
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Note: 19 pairs out of 22 have continuously exchanged turns. Among these 19 pairs 17 have exchanged turns after each period and two (pairs 1 and 19) exchanged turns 
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Figure C3.  Turn taking strategy, by pair and by period, One-Way-Communication 
 
 
Note: 24 pairs out of 31 exchanged their turns. The message sender monopolizes the good turn in three pairs (8, 11 and 27). 
